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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The  State  appeals  from  the  district  court’s  orders  granting  the  Mr.  Fenton’s  motion  to
suppress and denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.  The State claims the district court
erred when it held that the attenuation doctrine did not apply in this case.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In  February  of  2016,  despite  the  fact  that  Mr.  Fenton  had  committed  no  traffic
infractions,  and  the  registration  on  his  car  was  current,  Mr.  Fenton  was  stopped  by  Lewiston
Police Officer Stormes.  (R., p.109.)  Earlier that day, a different officer—Officer Eylar—was on
patrol when he saw a red GMC Yukon that he thought was registered to a person he knew from
“previous narcotic activity,” so he started following it.  (R., p.102; Tr., p.7, L.5 – p.8, L.15.)1
The Yukon stopped  at  a  store,  and  Officer  Eylar  took  a  position  nearby,  so  he  could  watch  it.
(Tr., p.8, Ls.18-23.)  He testified that “in his experience drug activity was common” at the store,
but he did not see anyone exit the Yukon, and he did not see anyone make contact with the
driver.  (R., p.102; Tr., p.9, Ls.2-22.)  When the vehicle left the parking lot, Officer Eylar
thought it was being followed by a white Pontiac Grand Prix.  (R., p.102; Tr., p.9, Ls.7-14.)  He
then called Officer Stormes to help him “keep an eye on the vehicles.”  (Tr., p.9, L.23 – p.10,
L.3.)  Officer Eylar followed the two vehicles until the Yukon parked at a gas station, and the
Grand Prix pulled up to the gas pumps at the station.  (R., p.102; Tr., p.10, Ls.4-17.)  He then
pulled into a parking lot to watch the vehicles, and Officer Stormes met up with him there.
(R., p.102; Tr., p.10, L.19 - p.11, L.1.)
1 All citations to the transcript refer to the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress held
on August 4, 2016.
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The officers discussed the situation, and Officer Stormes left the parking lot shortly
thereafter.  (R., p.102.)  When the Grand Prix left the parking lot, Officer Eylar radioed Officer
Stormes to let him know.  (R., p.102.)  Subsequently, Officer Stormes saw the Grand Prix
driving  and  contacted  dispatch  to  check  if  its  registration  was  current.   (R.,  p.102.)   However,
because Officer Stormes was “about 100 yards” away when he first called in the license plate
information, he could not see the plate clearly and told dispatch that the plate was “Idaho plate
180728.”  (R., p. 102; Tr., p.19, L1 – p.20, L.15, p.21, L.21 – p.22, L.1.)  Dispatch believed the
plate was out of Idaho County and entered “Ida 180728” but found no record for that number.
(Tr., p.19, L.1 – p.20, L.15; R., p.102.)  Officer Stormes then asked dispatch to change the last
number “from an 8 to a B to see if that made any difference in how the plate returned.”
(Tr., p.20, Ls.16-19; R., p.102.)  But dispatch found no record for that number either.
(R., p.102.)  Officer Stormes then stopped the car to see if the registration was current.
(R., p.102.)  He told dispatch that he was making the stop, and read the license plate number a
final time when he was close enough to the car to read the plate, but he did not hear back from
dispatch before he made the stop.  (R., p.103; Tr., p.22, Ls.6-24.)
Mr. Fenton was driving the Grand Prix, and he provided Officer Stormes with the current
registration for the car.  (R., p.103; Tr., p.23, L.3 – p.24, L.2.)  Therefore, as the district court
stated, “the registrations concerns were taken care of.”  (R., p.103.)  However, Mr. Fenton did
not have a current driver’s license or insurance, so Officer Stormes decided to write citations for
those violations.  (R., p.103; Tr., p.24, Ls.3-12.)  When Officer Stormes handed him the first
citation, Mr. Fenton said he was on probation.  (R., p.103; Tr., p.24, Ls.16-25.)  Officer Stormes
asked who his probation officer was and was able to determine that Mr. Fenton was on felony
probation.  (R., p.103; Tr., p.6-7.)  Then, instead of issuing the second citation, Officer Stormes
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went back to his vehicle and contacted the probation office.2  (R., p.103.)  He told the probation
officer, Officer Jensen, that he had stopped Mr. Fenton for a traffic infraction and informed her
about what he and Officer Eylar had seen at the store and the gas station.  (R., p.103; Tr., p.25,
L.23 – p.26, L.23.)
Officer Jensen said she would come to the scene and search the car.  (R., p.104.)  Officer
Stormes  then  told  Mr.  Fenton  that  Officer  Jensen  was  coming  and  wanted  him  to  “stand  by.”
(R., p.104; DVD at 36:15 – 36:35.)  He then gave Mr. Fenton the second citation and returned
his identification to him.  (DVD at 36:30 – 36:45; Tr., p.33, L.11 – p.34, L.8.)  Officer Jensen did
not arrive for over fifteen minutes.  (DVD at 31:00 – 46:30.)  When she arrived, Officer Stormes
assisted her with a search, and methamphetamine was subsequently discovered.  (R., p.104.)
Mr. Fenton was charged with one count of trafficking in methamphetamine.  (R., p.52.)
He filed a motion to suppress and argued that there was no reasonable suspicion for the traffic
stop, the stop was unlawfully prolonged, and there were no reasonable grounds to conduct a
probation search.  (R., pp.66-75.)
The district court found that that Officer Stormes’s mistake of fact regarding the license
plate was not objectively reasonable.  (R., p.108.)  Therefore, it held that neither the registration
issue nor Officer Eylar’s observations at the store and gas station provided reasonable suspicion
for the stop and granted the motion to suppress.  (R., p.109.)  However, the State filed a motion
for reconsideration and argued that the attenuation doctrine applied because Mr. Fenton’s status
as a probationer was an intervening circumstance equivalent to a valid warrant.  (R., pp.116-
118.)  The district court denied the motion and held that Mr. Fenton’s status as a probationer was
2 Officer Stormes was asked if this was “standard procedure” that he engaged in when he had
“contact  with  someone  who’s  on  felony  probation  in  the  community,”  and  he  said  it  was.
(Tr., p.25, Ls.19-22.)
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not an intervening circumstance equivalent to a valid warrant.  (R., p.179.)  It went on to hold,
“but for the officer’s error, the Defendant’s vehicle would not have been stopped, and the
probation officer would not have been contacted—thus a search would not have occurred.”
(R., p.179.)  The State filed a notice of appeal that was timely from the district court’s order
granting Mr. Fenton’s motion to suppress.
5
ISSUE
Has the State failed to show that the district court erred when it granted Mr. Fenton’s motion to
suppress and denied the State’s motion for reconsideration?
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ARGUMENT
The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Granted Mr. Fenton’s
Motion To Suppress And Denied The State’s Motion For Reconsideration
A. Introduction
The district court correctly held that Mr. Fenton’s probationary status was not an
intervening circumstance sufficient to attenuate the taint from Officer Stormes’s unlawful traffic
stop, and therefore the attenuation doctrine did not apply.  Officer Stormes’s discovery that
Mr. Fenton was on probation is not the same as an officer’s discovery that a warrant exists; it is a
distinction with a difference.
The discovery of a valid warrant is an intervening circumstance that supports attenuation
because the officer, upon discovering a warrant, has a duty to make an arrest or conduct a search.
The  officer  is  required  to  take  action—to  act  on  the  warrant.   No  such  duty  exists  when  it  is
discovered that a driver is on probation.  Indeed, the probationary search at issue here was
conducted at  the discretion of a third person, the probation officer.   She had no duty to search
either.  In this case, the probation officer’s decision to search was discretionary, and her decision
exploited Mr. Fenton’s unlawful detention.  Probation is a status, not a call to action.  Thus, the
district court was correct in concluding that probation status is not a sufficient intervening
circumstance to favor attenuation.  Because the other relevant attenuation factors also supported
the  district  court’s  holding,  this  Court  should  affirm  the  district  court’s  orders  granting
Mr. Fenton’s motion to suppress and denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.
B. Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that
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were supported by substantial evidence but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996).
C.  The District Court Properly Held That Officer Stormes’ Discovery That Mr. Fenton Was
On Probation Was Not Equivalent To The Discovery Of A Valid Warrant, And The
Attenuation Doctrine Did Not Apply
The State does not challenge the district court’s holding that the stop was unlawful.
(App. Br., p.6.)  Instead, it relies on State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841 (2004) and Utah v. Strieff, 136
S. Ct. 2056 (2016)—both warrant cases—to argue that the attenuation doctrine should have been
applied  in  this  case.   (App.  Br.,  pp.9-13.)   But  here,  Officer  Stormes  did  not  discover  a  valid
warrant that would have imposed a mandatory duty on him to arrest Mr. Fenton, and thus these
cases are inapposite.  The State cites no authority to support its claim that this Court should
expand the attenuation doctrine.  The district court did not err in concluding the doctrine does not
apply to a driver’s probation status.
The Fourth Amendment protects the people’s right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.  U.S. CONST., amend. IV; see also ID. CONST., art. I, § 17; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961) (the Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).  Evidence that the State obtains in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is generally excluded from a prosecution of the victim of the violation. Page, 140 at
846; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963).  The “exclusionary rule serves to
deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct . . . .” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 144 (2009).  This rule applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal government
action and evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality. Page, 140
Idaho at 846; Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484–85.  Once a defendant makes a showing that the
evidence to be suppressed was causally connected to the illegal state action, the burden shifts to
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the State to show that the unlawful conduct did not taint the evidence. State v. Cardenas, 143
Idaho 903, 908–09 (Ct. App. 2006).
“[T]he ultimate question is whether the police acquired the evidence from ‘exploitation of
[the] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.’” State v. Bigham, 141 Idaho 732, 734 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting United States v. Green,
111 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 1997), and Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).  The Idaho Supreme Court,
in Page, stated that courts consider the following three factors to determine whether the
attenuation doctrine applies:  “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of
the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose
of the improper law enforcement action.”  140 Idaho at 846 (citing Green, 111 F.3d at 521 and
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975)).  Recently, the United States Supreme Court
confirmed that this is the proper analysis. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062-63.
In Strieff, a detective was investigating an anonymous tip regarding “narcotics activity” at
a residence. Id. at 2059.  He saw Mr. Strieff leave the house and walk towards a store and then
detained him in the parking lot. Id. at 2060.  After requesting Mr. Strieff’s identification, the
detective called dispatch and discovered that Mr. Strieff had a valid outstanding warrant. Id.
The detective arrested Mr. Strieff and then found methamphetamine in the search incident to the
arrest. Id.
Mr. Strieff filed a motion to suppress and argued that he was unlawfully detained. Id.
The prosecutor conceded that the stop was not based on reasonable suspicion “but argued that
the evidence should not be suppressed because the existence of a valid arrest warrant attenuated
the connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of contraband.” Id. (emphasis
added).  The trial court agreed and denied the motion to suppress. Id.  Mr.  Strieff  entered  a
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conditional guilty plea and reserved his right to appeal the trial court’s decision on the motion to
suppress. Id.  The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed. Id.  It
held that only a voluntary act, such as a confession, could attenuate the connection between the
illegal stop and the discovery of contraband. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari “to resolve disagreement about how the attenuation doctrine applies where an
unconstitutional detention leads to the discovery of a valid arrest warrant.” Id.
The Court wrote, “Evidence is admissible when the connection between the
unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some
intervening circumstance. . . .” Id. at 2061.  The Court held that the attenuation doctrine was not
limited to situations in which there were “independent acts by the defendant.” Id.  It also noted
that the three-factor balancing test from Brown v. Illinois was the proper analysis. Id. at 2061-
62.  It found that the “temporal proximity between the initially unlawful stop and the search”
favored suppression because the officer discovered the contraband “only minutes after the illegal
stop.” Id. at  2062.   With  respect  to  the  second factor,  the  Court  noted  that  the  discovery  of  a
valid warrant supported application of the attenuation doctrine. Id.
Notably for this case, it held that, once the officer “discovered the warrant, he had an
obligation to arrest Strieff.  ‘A warrant is a judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a search or
make an arrest, and the officer has a sworn duty to carry out its provisions.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920, n. 21 (1984)).  The Court went on to note that
the officer’s “arrest of Strieff thus was a ministerial act that was independently compelled by the
pre-existing warrant.” Id. at 2063 (emphasis added).
Finally it found that the third factor favored the State because the officer was “at most
negligent.” Id. at 2063.  Therefore, it held that the evidence was admissible because the officer’s
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discovery of the valid arrest warrant “attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and
the evidence seized from Strieff incident to arrest.” Id. at 2064.
In this case, despite the State’s claim that there were “many intervening circumstances,”
its argument boils down to whether an officer’s discovery of a person’s probationary status is so
much like the discovery of a valid warrant that it supports attenuation.  (App. Br. pp.12-13.)  It is
not.   And the  State  cites  to  no  authority,  controlling  or  otherwise,  which  holds  that  it  is.   The
State relies exclusively on cases where arrest warrants were discovered.  (App. Br., pp.9-13.)  As
noted above, Strieff held that a valid arrest warrant was a sufficient intervening circumstance
because the officer had an obligation to arrest Mr. Strieff.  It stated that a warrant was a “judicial
mandate” to arrest Mr. Strieff. Id. at 2062.  Similarly, in Page, the discovery of a warrant was
crucial to this Court’s holding that attenuation applied.  It wrote, “Other jurisdictions . . . have
also adopted the rule that an outstanding arrest warrant gives the officer independent probable
cause to arrest such that, had the officers acted unlawfully, the warrant would constitute an
intervening circumstance dissipating the taint of an unlawful seizure.” Page, 140 Idaho at 846.
Officer Stormes’s discovery that Mr. Fenton was on probation was not a mandate to act
because it did not impose a duty to arrest Mr. Fenton, and it did not constitute independent
probable cause to arrest.  Further, as the State acknowledges, Officer Jensen’s search was not
mandated; it was discretionary.  (App. Br., p.13.)  The State explains, “That search was
conducted on Probation Officer Jensen’s authority, not Officer Stormes’ authority, and it was
Probation Officer Jensen’s decision to search the vehicle, not Officer Stormes’ decision.”
(App. Br., p.13 (emphasis added).)  As such, Officer Jensen exploited the fact that Mr. Fenton
was stopped without reasonable suspicion, and the district court correctly held, “While a
probationer may have agreed to a diminished expectation of privacy in exchange for being
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placed on probation, this is not equivalent to an active . . . warrant, which authorized the
immediate arrest of an individual.”  (R., p.179.)
This issue was addressed in People v. Bates, 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).3
There, after responding to a report of a theft, one of the deputies learned that a potential suspect,
Marcus Bates, was on felony probation with a warrantless search condition. Id. at 575-76.  The
deputy also learned that Mr. Bates lived in an apartment complex nearby. Id. at  576.  Several
deputies  went  to  the  complex  to  search  the  suspect’s  residence,  and  one  of  them saw a  person
matching the suspect’s description walking towards a mobile home park. Id.  One  of  the
deputies drove to the mobile home park’s access road and signaled for an exiting car to pull over.
Id.  When the deputy approached the car, the suspect identified himself as Marcus Bates, and the
deputy ordered him out of the car and searched him. Id. at 576-77.  Mr. Bates filed a motion to
suppress but, because of Mr. Bates’s “probation search condition,” the trial court held that the
deputies could detain and search him. Id. at 577.
After  concluding  that  the  stop  was  unlawful,  the Bates court  held  that  Mr.  Bates’s
“probation search condition was an insufficient attenuating circumstance.”4 Id. at 582.  Like
Strieff,  the court  pointed out the importance of the fact  that  “[i]n the case of an arrest  warrant,
officers essentially have a duty to  arrest  an  individual  once  the  outstanding  warrant  is
confirmed.” Id. (emphasis  added).   It  went  on  to  state,  “A probation  search  condition,  on  the
other hand, is a discretionary enforcement  tool  and  therefore  a less compelling intervening
circumstance than an arrest warrant.” Id. at 581-82 (emphasis added).
3 Like Idaho, California employed the same three-factor test when Bates was decided. Id. at 580-
81.  Thus Strieff did not alter its application of the attenuation doctrine.
4 It noted that another California appellate court—in People v. Durant, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 103 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2012)—did not consider whether the traffic stop at issue there was illegal but held that,
even if it was, “the defendant’s search condition attenuated any taint.” Id. at 581. The Bates
court, however, declined to adopt this reasoning. Id.
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The Bates Court was also concerned with the long-term implications of holding that
Mr. Bates’s probation search condition was equivalent to a warrant.  It wrote,
We take no issue with the lawfulness of probation search conditions, nor with the
ability of law enforcement to conduct suspicionless searches of known
probationers. Our discomfort is in extending these concepts to situations where an
individual's probation status is wholly unknown to law enforcement at the time of
the initial detention and is used only after the fact to justify an otherwise unlawful
search.
Id. at 582.
This case is no different.  In short, the State’s position is not only unsupported by Strieff
or Page, it is also an attempt to unreasonably expand those holdings.  Discovery of a person’s
probation status is not equivalent to the discovery of an active warrant.  Therefore, the
intervening circumstance here is not compelling and favors suppression.
The  other  relevant  factors  also  favor  suppression.   The  State  argues  that  the  temporal
proximity between Officer Stormes’s unlawful detention and the discovery of the evidence is
“far more remote” than in Strieff or Page and therefore this factor only “weakly” favors
suppression.  (App. Br., pp.13-14.)  This argument ignores several key facts.  First, the main
reason for the delay was that the police officers had to wait over fifteen minutes for Officer
Jensen to arrive.  (DVD at 31:00 – 46:30.)  Second, less than fifty minutes elapsed from the time
Officer  Stormes  stopped  Mr.  Fenton  to  when  the  evidence  was  discovered  (DVD  at  2:30  –
50:30), far less than the nearly two hours in Brown that was found to be insufficiently lengthy.
See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (“Our precedents have declined to find that this factor favors
attenuation unless ‘substantial time’ elapses between an unlawful act and when the evidence is
obtained,” noting that, in Brown, a period of less than two hours favored suppression.) Id.
Therefore, in this case, this factor strongly favors suppression.
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Officer Stormes’s conduct when making the stop also favors suppression.  He called in
the license plate information before he could see the plate clearly.  (Tr., p.21, L.21 – p.22, L.1.)
Then, once he was close enough to the car to actually see the plate clearly, he did not bother to
wait until dispatch got back to him to tell him that the car’s registration was indeed current.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.22-24; R., pp.102-03.)  Instead, he just stopped the car.  This is the kind of
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent” conduct that should be deterred by suppression.
Therefore, the State has not met its burden to show that Officer Stormes’s unlawful conduct did
not taint the evidence.
 In light of these factors, this Court should affirm the district court’s orders granting
Mr. Fenton’s motion to suppress and denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful stop.
Therefore, Mr. Fenton respectfully requests that this Court affirm the order suppressing the
evidence.
DATED this 9th day of May, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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